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Corruption is a global problem that feeds on national and local 
opportunities. Instead of the prevailing attempts to reduce anti-corruption 
strategies to the protection of business interests, corruption needs to be seen 
as a sociopolitical relation that emanates from the convergence between 
more immediate circumstances and long-term institutional tendencies. 
Corruption is, therefore, a phenomenon with synchronic and diachronic 
dimensions. The complexity of corruption is examined in relation to the 
organization of Peruvian state and society, in particular considering the 
recent liberalization reforms and investments in the water industry of Lima. 
The Peruvian case study shows how corruption becomes a productive force 
from the perspective of conservative elites and the maintenance of political 
hegemony.    
 
Keywords: corruption, social exclusion, public services, development, 




In the last months of 2000, after ten years in the command of the 
country, the government of Alberto Fujimori suddenly collapsed.  
The president and other authorities managed to leave Peru using 
various strategies, but their departure exposed a vast scheme of 
organized corruption in an industrial scale. The evidences were 
astonishing and involved a large number of politicians, generals and 
TV entertainers. Apart from the president, the other key accomplice 
was his closest and sinister advisor, Montesinos, a former army 
officer with extravagant habits, zero scruples and a notorious ability 
to command illegal activities and bribe extensively and 
systematically (Carey, 2003). The whole story is now well known 
and contributes a great deal to the negative image of Latin American 
leaders and the persistent stigma of the regional political system 
(Matossian, 2010; Meléndez and León, 2010). If we fast forward a bit 
more than a decade, we find the national government in the hands of 
lieutenant-colonel Ollanta Humala, the winner of the 2011 election 
and guarantor of neoliberal policies that have largely depended on the 
export of primary commodities. Fujimori ended up in jail in April 
2009, after being found guilty of a series of murder crimes and the 
illegal payment of US$ 15 million to Montesinos (to keep the mouth 
shut after his downfall). The imprisonment and public deprecation of 
Fujimori did not prevent his daughter (and former first-lady of the 
divorced president) to become a central presidential candidate in the 
2011 election and in other future campaigns. Alan García, the 
controversial president who preceded both Humala and Fujimori, in 
his two mandates so far, has also had a career marked by corruption 
scandals, but nonetheless remains a chief political figure. 
The resilience of corruption practices in Peru provides the context 
and the motivation of the present, qualitative analysis. The aim here 
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is to provide a critical reflection and comment upon the meaning and 
consequences of the non-linear metabolism of corruption in Latin 
America, using Peru as an emblematic entry point. Other notorious 
cases have attracted international attention in recent years, such as 
the mensalão in Brazil and the strange relation between the Kirchner 
presidential couple and construction companies in Argentina. This 
prompted some high-level reactions, as the grand plan against 
corruption drew up by the leaders in the first Summit of the Americas 
in 1994, leading to the Inter-American Convention against 
Corruption (approved in 1996). However, instead of containing it, the 
main consequence of extensive media attention is rather the 
banalization of corruption as a problem deeply consolidated in 
political traditions and the presence of corrupted circles as an 
inevitable landmark of most regional governments. The existing 
literature on corruption – advanced by the mainstream academics and 
agencies such as the World Bank, Transparency International and the 
OECD – is normally unable to explain the more integral and 
multidimensional basis of corruption. Corruption remains an active 
driving force and represents a robust, intergenerational social 
institution that is effectively non-negotiable. 
The current article is based on fieldwork in Lima that included 24 
semi-structured interviews, the attendance of public events and 
critical discourse analysis of media articles, documents and policies 
between 2013-2014. The analysis of recent developments was 
extremely important to inform the examination of lasting patterns of 
corruption. The methodological approach had to overcome the 
intrinsic difficulty of any study of corruption or illegal activities that 
are, by their own nature, slippery and unaccountable. As Lazar 
(2005: 212) puts it, corruption is everywhere and nowhere, “it is 
always somewhere else perpetrated by someone else.” Perhaps a little 
ironically – but certainly fortunate from a research standpoint – the 
bulk of the fieldwork (in the first half of 2013) coincided with the 
surfacing of a major scandal regarding the water services of Lima 
during the previous García administration. In particular, the 
management of the water utility SEDAPAL and the investment 
programme Water For All (APT), which combined public funds and 
private companies (Ioris, 2012), proved to be fraught with 
negligence, populism and corruption. It was evident that corruption 
scandals helped to sell newspapers and amused the audience of TV 
programmes, but did not affect the defence of the economic model 
adopted in Peru in recent decades. The connection between the 
mainstream economic argument and the treatment of corruption as a 
public spectacle (that rarely has any serious consequences for those 
who practice it) is, ultimately, highly revealing of the shortcomings 
andimbalances of contemporary Peruvian society.  
The present text is justified by the need to investigate the multiple 
sources and perennial reinforcement of corruption. That means a 
radically different conceptualization of corruption, not as a mere 
deformation of public services and policies (as extensively discussed 
in the traditional literature, which is too long to review here; see for 
example World Bank, 2007), but as an integral feature of the 
organization and operation of contemporary mechanisms of social 
exclusion and (problematic) political legitimization. It should be 
recognized that fraud and corruption incidents are always firmly 
grounded on concrete historic-geographical settings and incorporate 
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the long trajectory of politico-economic processes and the 
politicization of statehood. The metabolism of corruption evolves 
through various stages that combine permanence and renovation, as 
much as the already mentioned spatial and scalar interconnections. 
Corruption persists in the social tissue of highly unequal societies 
only to resurface in an intense fashion when the politico-institutional 
circumstances are more favourable.  
In conceptual terms, the persistence and the new impacts of 
corruption derive from a dynamic interface between synchronic and 
diachronic pressures. Corruption, as a social relation that reflects 
group and class inequalities, remains alive in those same inequalities 
during long periods of time (which corresponds to its diachronic 
dimension) but proliferate synergically across different sectors and 
activities whenever the mechanisms of control are relaxed (its 
synchronic dimension). The synchronicity of corruption contains the 
convergence of the appropriation of public resources, sociopolitical 
asymmetries, weak control systems and the absence of a genuine 
democratic, transparent political regime. Diachronic corruption, in its 
turn, is located in the (also historic-geographical) relations of 
production, allocation and reproduction. Moreover, while synchronic 
production is localised in certain places, sectors or moments, 
diachronic corruption incorporates the legacy of past injustices and 
replicates it on present and coming socionatural formations. 
Synchronic corruption is the manifestation of the more persistent and 
even more perverse course of diachronic corruption.  
The synchronic manifestation of the historic-geographical 
phenomenon of corruption is an element of the lived, but profoundly 
unequal, space of nations, regions and urban or rural areas. In the 
case of the fast growing megacities of the Global South, the 
metabolism of corruption plays a very important role in the formation 
of uneven and harsh urban landscapes. The unequal megacity is a 
locus of condensed corruption, demonstrated by the scarcity of 
housing, water and services in some areas next to pockets of wealth 
(i.e. urban corruption is another expression of the widespread crisis 
of capitalist overaccumulation, as capitalism evolved from abundance 
of scarcity to scarcity and abundance). 
The pulse between synchronic and diachronic corruption provides 
a better explanatory tool than the more common, but static, argument 
about ‘systematic corruption’ (e.g. Johnston, 1998). The explanation 
around systematic corruption typically fails to consider the also 
important roots of corruption in national development and social 
inequalities.  In contrast, it is the mutual reinforcement between 
diachronic and synchronic axes that makes corruption such a resilient 
and challenging problem. Because of synchronic and diachronic 
tendencies, corruption is a highly contextual but also a generalisable 
phenomenon that tells a great deal about the uniqueness and 
commonalities of local and national development experiences in 
different parts of the planet. More significant than trying to assess 
whether corruption is increasing or decreasing is the careful 
consideration of the diachronic and synchronic manifestations of 
corruption and what these means for the legitimization or 
transformation of socioeconomic relations, as analysed next in 
relation to Peru.  
 




We may start the analysis with a reference to one of the most 
famous books published by a Peruvian author: Conversation in the 
Cathedral, by Vargas Llosa (published in 1969). The story takes 
place in the post-World War II years, characterized by political 
instability, authoritarianism and recurrent corruption scandals that 
basically reproduced many of the controversies faced by the country 
since independence. The government of Odría (1948-1956) combined 
populist measures with a harsh treatment of left-wing groups and 
rampant corruption. The context of limited economic and political 
liberties of the time, amid the rapid enrichment of president’s 
advisors and ministers, was brilliantly captured by Vargas Llosa. The 
main character in the story is Cayo Bermúdez (also known as Cayo 
Mierda, inspired in Alejandro Esparza Zañartu, the right-hand man of 
Odría for political repression). Don Cayo is the paradigm of an 
opportunist, violent and corrupt minister.  
Vargas Llosa’s book shows the promiscuous relation of civilian 
and military authorities and the struggle to maintain close proximity 
to power. For a while, Cayo is a key figure in the central 
administration, charging substantial bribe in exchange for facilitated 
contracts and inflated payments. Moreover, he is fully aware of the 
transitory nature of his influence and the vulnerable position of all 
leaders, including General Odría. Don Cayo knows that his role is 
doing a dirty job that is only temporary and that he will be later the 
obvious culprit of the excesses perpetrated by the administration. In 
his words: “Cuando el régimen se termine, el que cargará con los 
platos rotos seré yo” [When the political regime is over, I will be the 
one responsible for the broken plates] (Vargas Llosa 2010: 325). The 
predictable of debacle of the minister mishandles a situation of 
regional strike and allows too much violence to take place. Cayo is 
expelled from government and escapes to Brazil, not without leaving 
a serious message about how to operate in a corruption circle: “No te 
fíes ni de tu madre” [Don’t trust even your mother] (p. 557). In real 
life, history was more understanding and Odría managed to negotiate 
a transition to formal democracy in exchange for a generous amnesty 
to him and his ministers.  
Between the 1960s and 1980s, Peru was governed by elected 
presidents and military dictators who promoted different nationalistic 
policies but never really attempted, or were able, to curb 
institutionalized corruption. The limitary coup of 1968 marked the 
end of the old oligarchy and opened space for the emergence of new 
groups and networks of power that once again reproduced huge 
social inequalities (Figueroa, 2002). Corruption was nurtured by 
growing drug production and the rambling effort to control the 
advance of leftist guerrillas in the 1980s. The most destabilizing 
politician of this period was Alan García, the first and only president 
affiliated to APRA, which is the oldest and best organized political 
party of Peru, founded in 1924 with a revolutionary manifesto but 
with a long history of populism and connivance with corrupted 
practices. Numerous cases of corruption emerged during his 
government, among those the very suspicious purchase of Mirage 
fighter planes and deposit of national reserves in the troubled bank 
BCCI (which was notoriously involved in money laundering and 
weapons trafficking). García finished his government with 
hyperinflation, instability and a turbulent handover to the next 
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president, Alberto Fujimori. Due to numerous allegations of 
corruption and mismanagement, García spent most of the 1990s self-
exiled in Paris and articulating his defence and return to political life. 
Instead of being found guilty of corruption crimes, García 
orchestrated a surprising comeback to the presidential palace. “The 
history of the legal cases against him between 1990 and 2001 
illustrates a pattern of manipulation and exploitation of judicial 
incompetence and corruption as a means to regain power, which 
García managed to do in 2006” (Quiroz, 2008: 347). The 
diachronicity of corruption re-emerged in the last decades of the 
century with the widespread, synchronic cases of fraud and graft 
fostered by the liberalization of economy and politics in Peru. 
 
 
The Corruption of Neoliberalism or the Neoliberalization of 
Corruption 
 
Fujimori, the improvised candidate and unexpected winner of the 
1990 election (to a large extent, due to the unstated, but crucial, 
support received by Alan García in his vicious rejection of Vargas 
Llosa’s candidacy), seemed to be the right man in the right place for 
the job. At least from the perspective of the business sectors and their 
expectation that hyperinflation and the Maoist guerrilla were both 
contained. The radical neoliberalism promoted by Fujimori served to 
consolidate the trend, initiated in the previous decade, of power 
concentration in the hands of emerging, significantly more 
homogenous economic elite associated with international 
corporations (Durand, 2011). In parallel, and nurtured by the 
neoliberal disassembling of the Peruvian state, Fujimori and his team 
did their best to accumulate huge sums of money. One of the initial 
steps to secure that goal was the pocketing of donations made by the 
Japanese government for the needs of poor children in Peru (US$ 
12.5 million); Japan donated around US$ 100 million for 
humanitarian causes during the decade, but 90% ended up in the 
personal accounts of Fujimori and his relatives (Quiroz, 2008: 378). 
In 1992, the regime became semi-dictatorial thanks to a auto-golpe 
[self-coup], which allowed the replacement of the last vestiges of an 
underdeveloped form of Keynesian state with liberalizing measures 
aimed to stabilize the economy and bring inflation under control. The 
last years of the Fujimori administration were marred by corruption 
in a massive scale by the president and members of the cabinet. What 
became clear only a little later was the extent of organized corruption 
being managed from the top of the national administration (at that 
stage Weyland (1998) still exempted the president from the 
widespread corruption, blaming only Fujimori’s top advisers).  
The Fujimori government was not only an acute case of 
authoritarian neoliberalism, but became a true kleptocracy that 
operated through three different mafias specialized in robbing 
separate structures of the state: the ‘white mafia’ led by Jorge Camet 
(Economy Minister), the ‘yellow mafia’ in the hands of Fujimori and 
the ‘green mafia’ (green of the military uniforms) managed by 
Montesinos (Durand, 2003). It was particularly the frantic activity of 
Montesinos, on behalf of Fujimori and other cronies, responded for 
the strength and continuation of the government. The special advisor 
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was extremely competent in his extensive bribing and blackmailing 
of generals, politicians and journalists. Montesinos accumulated 
increasingly power after the (dodgy) re-election of 1995 and operated 
in many different fronts, including the channelling of money 
obtained from the privatization of public utilities to buy military 
planes from Belarus for US$ 470 million (obviously charging a 
handsome commission for the operation) and the mediation of 10,000 
AK-47 rifles to the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) 
against the interests of the USA (the transaction was later discovered 
by the CIA and precipitated Montesinos downfall). The regime 
became closely involved in the repeated violation of human rights 
and in the payment of illicit commission to foreign countries and 
arms and drug dealers (Calderón Navarro, 2006). It became gradually 
more evident in the last years of the Fujimori administration that who 
was actually in charge of the country was Montesinos and that the 
‘elected’ president was rather a symbolic figure (Durand, 2003; 
Caistor and Villarán, 2006).  
Because of the divestiture of state utilities and companies, 
conducted according to the neoliberal canon of the time, Fujimori 
was publicly credited with having reduced petty corruption in state 
companies, however in reality corruption remained pervasive and 
deeply institutionalized, particularly bribes paid to the judiciary, the 
policy and local authorities (Hunt, 2006). Beyond the immediate 
appropriation of public money and the enrichment of mafia-like 
circles, the hypertrophy of corruption was instrumental for the 
consolidation of illegal or semi-illegal economic activities. The 
Fujimori administration maintained promiscuous connections 
between civil servants and corporations, in special the back and forth 
movement of people that work for the government, then work for a 
corporation just to go back to the government again. The agencies 
established to control corruption – particularly the Controladoría 
General de la República and the Oficina Nacional Anticorrupción 
(replaced by the Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción) – were constantly 
undermined and unable to do much about the misuse of public funds 
(Grampone and Barrenechea, 2010). An investigation by the post-
Fujimori congress found that corruption was indeed happening in a 
massive scale, including the siphoning of money from pension 
schemes, the privatization of public companies, foreign debt 
negotiation, and drugs and arms trafficking (Congreso de la 
República, 2003). It is estimated, although it is very difficult to 
demonstrate, that corruption during the Fujimori regime reached 50% 
of total state expenditures, something like an annual average between 
US$ 1.4-2.0 billion, which means a total loss between US$ 14-20 
billion during the 1990s (Quiroz, 2008).  
Corruption by the Fujimori government was associated with rent-
seeking and mercantilist economic behaviour, as well as political 
cynicism and apathy (Cotler and Cuenca, 2011). The situation of 
limited civil liberties and energised corruption emanating from the 
highest echelons of the public administration, together with growing 
demand in North America, paved the road to the growth of a vast 
chain of cocaine production, concealment and distribution 
(Gootenberg, 2006). During the decade, mineral extraction expanded 
enormously in Peru due to a combination of high prices in 
international markets, new technologies and the institutional 
guarantees offered by the government to foreign investors. Between 
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1990-1997, while sectoral investments increased by 90% in the 
world, in Latin America the expansion of mineral production reached 
400% and in Peru it was 2,000% (World Bank, 2005, in Bebbington, 
2011: 53). In 1996, a new legislation centralized and simplified the 
concession of licences for mineral extraction, at the expense of the 
rights, needs and demands of communities living in the mountains 
and in the Amazon. It stimulated the internationalization of the 
mining sector in the hands of large corporations. Fujimori and 
Montesinos, especially after 1996, disorganized the control systems 
of the Peruvian State (including the judiciary, public prosecutors and 
the media) to feed the money hunger of their criminal circle. In doing 
so, they were compelled to flexibilize state control over both national 
and international companies, which incidentally became tacit allies of 
the government. This connection between the immediate ambitions 
of corrupt authorities and bribe-paying companies was more than 
fortuitous, but the great corrupting power of the Fujimori regime was 
the establishment of renewed mechanisms of economic exploitation 
and ideological mystification. 
Under growing scandals and an economic downturn, the 
Fujimori government crumbled in 2000 and was followed by 
the interim administration of Valentín Paniagua, which took 
several important measures to restore some confidence in the 
judicial system. The nefarious modus operandi of Montesinos 
was exposed (ironically, it was facilitated by the videos 
recorded by Montesinos himself, known as vladivideos) and led 
to the arrest of more than 60 people (politicians, judges, 
generals and businessmen) caught in the web of corruption 
spun by the regime. The National Anticorruption Initiative 
(INA), promoted by the Ministry of Justice, was an attempt to 
bridge state and civil society. However, other plans and 
suggestions were never implemented and quickly shelved by 
the next administrations. In July 2001, the economist Alejandro 
Toledo started his government with good level of political 
approval. Nonetheless, the new president was soon criticised 
for the mishandling of privatization and for his turbulent 
negotiation with civil servants. President Toledo was personally 
affected by bad publicity about his personal habits (e.g. 
purchase of expensive liquor and lavish holidays) and because 
several of his advisors were involved in cases of corruption. 
Toledo concentrated on prosecuting those involved in the 
Montesinos affair, but failed to adopt anti-corruption 
recommendations of agencies such as the World Bank once the 
new anti-corruption mechanisms threatened his own 
government (Hunt, 2006). Despite the evident condemnation of 
corruption during the Fujimori years, the Peruvian judiciary 
continued to lack financial resources, inadequate budget and 
limited transparency of the anticorruption system (Calderón 
Navarro, 2006). At the same time, a significant proportion of 
the media was still associated with the Montesinos Mafia and 
used that information to press for amnesty of those being 
prosecuted. The Toledo administration gradually lost interest in 
advancing more efficient procedures to curb corruption, which 
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became even worse under the subsequent government (Pariona 
Arana, 2012). The first decade of formal democracy (after the 
end of the Fujimori dark years) neither removed the 
authoritarian legacy nor reduced social conflicts and 
widespread corruption (Meléndez and León, 2010). 
The 2003 report of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 
– the commission had been set up by Paniagua to investigate 
allegations of recent human rights violations – contained a 
comprehensive assessment of the period 1980-2000 and related 
corruption and violence to the long legacy of inequalities and the 
shortcomings of the Peruvian public sector (McClintock, 2006). 
Despite the course of action recommended by the Commission, 
Toledo showed signs of hesitation and had very little political 
appetite to advance a serious reform of the judicial system and of the 
military. Since the downfall of Fujimori, the reaction against 
corruption gradually lost prominence in favour of economic growth 
and market expansion (Peña-Mancillas, 2011). The reluctance to 
fight the roots of corruption was followed by the determination of the 
next president – Alan García, who capriciously returned to the 
presidential palace in 2006 – to exercise his undue influence over the 
judiciary, the congress and his own party (APRA). García is probably 
the main character of the recent history of Peruvian politics, the 
person who made Fujimori a victorious candidate, forced the 
retirement of Vargas Llosa from politics, sustained Fujimori’s legacy 
and consolidated neoliberalism. García incarnates the old populist 
patrimonialism of the Latin American elites, disguised in neoliberal 
colours and subordinate to the logic of globalized markets. Just as in 
the 1980s, García controlled his party and in the country through 
mysterious manoeuvrings and had his name constantly associated 
with questionable practices. During his second term as president, 
García strived to advance the neoliberal agenda, which included 
several free-trade agreements, concessions of natural reserves and 
contracts with foreign construction and investment companies.  
To be sure, the election of García can only be explained by 
the fear that the other candidate in the second round of the 2006 
elections – Ollanta Humala, another improvised candidate, 
uncomfortably supported by Evo Morales and Hugo Chávez – 
could undo the neoliberal achievements since 1990. García 
used his vast political expertise and profound knowledge of the 
electoral game to promote a business-friendly image (e.g. 
promised to support the USA-Peru trade liberalization) 
combined with demagogic proposals. García was so 
comfortable using his populist and centralizing approach that 
even acknowledged, with a dose of irony, the stereotype of 
APRA politicians as notoriously corrupt (McClintock, 2006). 
After the electoral victory and the return to the presidential 
palace, the García’s administration was marred by scandals 
involving bribes and suspicious activities. In 2008, the case of 
the ‘petroaudios’ attracted huge attention and forced the 
resignation of the prime minister and supreme court judges: 
videos were made public with executives of the Peruvian state-
owned petroleum company Petroperú negotiating payments by 
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the Norwegian company Discover Petroleum to facilitate the 
wining of exploration contracts. Not by coincidence, also in 
2008 García closed down the Oficina Nacional Anticorrupción 
(Grampone and Barrenechea, 2010). While the anti-corruption 
instruments were scaled down, there was a significant 
sophistication of illegal practices or the corruption associated 
with economic activities. 
Another strange incident happened when García accepted a 
private dinner invitation from the writer and journalist Jaime 
Bayly in 2010. What really happened is not entirely clear, but 
Bayly later affirmed that the president incited him to run for 
office in the next general election, despite the journalist’s 
disappointment with the official salary (something like US$ 
3,000/month). According to Bayly, García lighted and candidly 
reassured him that it should be no problem because, once you 
become president, “the money arrives on its own” [the full 
sentence was a bit more vulgar: “no seas cojudo, hombre, la 
plata llega sola”]. In the same evening, García apparently 
claimed that, if Humala wins the election, he would lead a coup 
d’état to ‘free the country’ (sic) from such threat (Bayly, 2010). 
The result of the 2011 general election – the dispute for the 
succession of President Alan García – was once again extraordinary. 
First, repeating what had happened in 1990, García destroyed any 
chance of his party, APRA, to gain the election in order to leave the 
door open for him in the next presidential election in 2016. Second, 
for several years before the election, very few people believed in the 
possibilities of Ollanta Humala, especially because of his 
unconventional career, nationalist discourse and confusing political 
allegiances. In the second round, Humala competed against Keiko 
Fujimori (who is a strong candidate for the 2016 presidential 
elections), the congresswoman who was converted into the new 
leader of the Fujimori clan. Humala’s victory and his almost 
immediate submission to the neoliberal order was part of Latin 
American’s movement to a different, pero no mucho, state of 
capitalist production. The day he was invested with the office of 
president, Humala promised allegiance to the Constitution of 1979 
(approved in the process of redemocratization after the military 
period), but in practice quickly moved to become a defender of the 
1993 neoliberalizing constitution introduced by Fujimori. It follows 
the trend of left-wing politicians coming to power in Latin America 
to introduce some social concessions (especially as conditional cash 
transfer programmes) but mainly to manage an hegemonic neo- 
extractivism that frustrates those expecting deeper changes (Burbach 
et al., 2013). 
Humala tried to give to the national and international public the 
impression that he was going to take corruption seriously. The 
National Anti-Corruption Plan was published in 2012 (Supreme 
Decree No. 119) and the Anti-Corruption Strategy of the Executive 
Branch was introduced in 2013 (Supreme Decree No. 046) with a set 
of principles and recommendations. The government strengthened 
the work of the Prosecutor Anti-Corruption that had been established 
in 2001 and then watered down by García (although in 2013 it was 
still spending most of its energy on petty crime instead of large 
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corruption incidents). There were 20,000 cases of corruption under 
consideration in 2013, but a main problem was still the lack of 
resources and specialized knowledge of investigators and judges.  
Under the leadership of the recent presidents, the Peruvian 
economy remained significantly dependent on mineral exploitation, 
as well as the commercialization of imported goods. The concession 
of mining activities to foreign companies continued to create 
opportunities for new rounds of corruption, as well as the 
intensification of socioenvironmental conflicts. According to the 
Defensoría del Pueblo (2009), 46% of social conflicts in 2009 were 
related to socioenvironmental disputes. The most violent was the 
Baguazo, when indigenous communities occupied roads against new 
laws passed by García to allow oil and mining companies to enter 
their territories without consent or consultation of the local 
communities (García claimed these laws were necessary to 
implement a Free Trade Agreement with USA). The police attacked 
on the 06 June 2009 and the clash resulted, according to official 
government sources, in 5 civilians killed and 5 natives, 23 policemen 
and 89 people wounded; journalist and indigenous leaders bitterly 
disagreed and some claimed that hundred were killed and the corpses 
were thrown to the river (BBC, 2009).  
A further and notorious example was the concession granted by 
the García administration to American company Newmont to explore 
Conga, near the northern city of Cajamarca. The US$ 4.8 billion 
project was supposed to start production in 2015, but the local 
communities voiced fierce protest against the threat to their water 
supplies due to the inadequate provisions to prevent lake 
contamination. Conga was approved in the context of 20 years of 
growing mining activity together with the relative absence of the 
state from the process of conflict negotiation and resolution (De 
Echave and Diez, 2013). There were mounting tensions during the 
assessment of the Environmental Impact Assessment, which 
prompted a number of marches and demonstrations in several 
localities. In July 2012 the conflict scaled and five persons died and 
many others were injured by the police. The project was eventually 
suspended once it was accepted that it lacked the minimal conditions 
for its implementation. Apart from mining operations, investments in 
the water sector of Lima also provided favourable opportunities for 
politico-economic disputes and associated forms of synchronic 
corruption. 
 
Water Sector Ramifications of Diachronic and Synchronic 
Corruption 
 
As mentioned above, the water industry of Lima was a privileged 
locus for corruption and populist measures during the García 
administration. It was certainly not a simple coincidence that most of 
the corruption accusations against President García investigated was 
related to the projects and investments in water services. On the 
contrary, the manipulation of water supply of the capital city has 
been a recurrent expedient employed to assist party politics and 
enrich corrupted authorities. The fact that around a third of the 
national population lives in the capital means that the announcement 
of water infrastructure projects for the crowded periphery of the 
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megacity has huge political appeal and easily justifies vast sums of 
money to be invested in (sometimes questionable) water treatment 
works (there has been much less interest in sewage collection and 
treatment). Particularly since the middle of the 20th Century, with 
high rates of demographic growth and growing water demand, all 
governments promised to treat the most urgent water problems of 
Lima as a top priority, which invariably led to rushed investments, 
waste of resources and corruption. Not surprisingly, despite the 
sustained discourse about improving water services, water scarcity 
and poor water quality remain key problems for many communities 
or entire settlement. Persistent water problems continue to affect not 
only the marginal areas of the city (with around 5% of population 
without public services), but 48% of the population of metropolitan 
Lima suffer from water of substandard quality (RPP, 2013). 
There were early signs of extensive corruption affecting the water 
utility SEDAPAL even before the transition to the administration of 
Ollanta Humala. For instance, in 2010, the chief-executive of 
SEDAPAL (Guillermo León) had to resign due to serious allegations 
of corruption in new water treatment plants involving members of his 
family, politicians and private contractors (El Comercio, 2010). Also 
an investigation for the TV programme Panorama, of the local 
Channel 5, revealed the recorded voice of a politician of the ruling 
party (Julio Herrera) negotiating the results of tendering processes 
related to the improvement of the services in San Pedro de 
Carabayllo (La República, 2011). The irrefutable evidences of graft 
and dishonesty during the García government, together with the 
reduced number of congress members from his party (APRA) after 
the 2011 election (i.e. there were not enough congressmen to stop the 
investigation), prompted to the formation of an investigative 
commission, known as the megacommission (megacomisión). Part of 
its remits was to scrutinize the Water For All (APT) programme in 
Lima (including the allegation of fraud, incompatible transactions 
and the abuse of public office in 1,584 engineering works with a total 
cost of around US$ 2.0 billion). APT attracted large construction and 
consultancy companies to do business with the water utility of Lima, 
even beyond its supervisory capacity. With massive investments in a 
short period of time and careless control of targets and payments, 
APT created very favourable conditions for mismanagement and 
corruption. Particularly the wastewater treatment plants of Taboada 
(US$ 342 million) and La Chira (US$ 192 million) had serious 
suggestions of corruption (Ioris, 2013).  
Based on the evidence put before the megacommission, it became 
crystal clear that the invocation of the urgency was very instrumental 
in facilitating adjustments in original plans and without the need of a 
careful technical justification or legality of the changes. As 
repeatedly affirmed by the chairman of the megacommission, 
Congressman Sergio Tejada, in many occasions, the García 
government issued emergency decrees that facilitated the approval 
and speeded up the execution of the projects with reduced control 
and monitoring (Hildebrandt en Sus Trece, 2013a). APT was so 
ambitious that overloaded SEDAPAL with multiple construction 
works, although the programme only included modest funds for 
infrastructure maintenance (the obvious explanation was the much 
easier and quicker deviation of money from large constructions, 
especially when carried out simultaneously and with very limited 
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supervision). In New Pachacútec, a large settlement in the north of 
Lima, major projects were initiated with only superficial technical 
plans and without even sorting out the ownership of the terrain (El 
Comercio, 2013a). Several of those interviewed during this research 
mentioned that there is a tacit agreement that at least 10% of the total 
cost of an engineering project was diverted to politicians and to the 
administrators of the public utility. As typically happens in similar 
circumstances, after leaving office Alan García started to make 
conferences, at the cost of US$ 60,000 each, often paid by the same 
companies that own profitable contracts with his government (El 
Comercio, 2013b). In that context, the Attorney General’s office 
ordered the lifting of banking secrecy of Alan García’s accounts to 
facilitate the investigation of wrongdoings. García had publicly 
acknowledged the purchase of a US$ 830,000 new house but 
explained, with a great dose of sarcasm, that the money was obtained 
from the selling of books and conferences. While shocking 
revelations coming from the megacommission, the ex-president took 
a surprisingly aggressive approach and constantly tried to underplay 
the significance and the validity of their work. The megacommission 
was attracted fierce reaction from García and his closest allies, who 
repeatedly argued that its main purpose was to prevent the next 
candidacy of the former president in 2016 (El Comercio, 2013c). In 
May 2013, the megacommission decided to formally accuse García 
for numerous the irregularities, but the ex-president immediately 
replied that it was a ‘Chavist manoeuvring’ [reference to the late 
Hugo Chavez of Venezuela] and that his efforts to expand the water 
services of Lima were merely the operationalization of a decision 
made by the former president Toledo. As it is widely recognized, 
García continued to maintain strong personal connections with 
judges and supreme court members appointed during his two 
administrations, which helps to explain why the former president acts 
as if had some sort of immunity from prosecution.  
The material consequences of the investigation by the 
megacommission were far from certain. Nonetheless, the controversy 
around corruption in the water industry of Lima served as 
justification for reducing public subsidies and even the privatization 
of SEDAPAL (which was intended in the 1990s and then dropped 
due to operational difficulties and political resistance, see Ioris, 
2012). Utility privatization never really disappeared from the agenda 
of multilateral agencies working in Peru, but this argument returned 
more strongly once the mismanagement of the Water for All    
programme and misconduct in SEDAPAL. That was clearly the 
position taken by the most influential newspaper of Peru, El 
Comercio, in its editorial page during the coverage of the 
megacommission’s work. In January 2013, the newspaper editors 
identified as the main problem of water services in Lima the fact that 
these remain in the hands of the state. Different than other sectors, 
SEDAPAL is state-owned, that is, “has no owner and, therefore, 
nobody there is interested in doing the right thing in order to make it 
more profitable”. Instead of focusing on social demands for better 
services and the criminal activities of utility managers, the newspaper 
attacks the government itself for the failures. In their view, “the 
government forgets that problem of SEDAPAL is not the lack of 
resources, but the lack of incentives to do its job” (El Comercio, 
2013d). It is evident here the employment of the same anti-state 
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discourse – disguised as anti-corruption appeals – advanced by 
mainstream organizations with neoliberalizing inclinations.  
A clear evidence of the insistence on the same model of water 
services, highly vulnerable to corruption, was the announcement in 
2013 of new investments (8.443 billion soles or around US$ 3.27 
billion) in 148 water projects by the new administration of Ollanta 
Humala to expand the coverage of potable water and improve the 
pipeline network. Once again the promise is to reach 100% of service 
coverage and benefit two million residents in 3,600 human 
settlements by mid-2016. It is highly significant that such 
investments were announced without any significant change in the 
rationale of water management and in the relation between 
SEDAPAL and its clients. One disturbing indication of how things 
remain practically unchanged is the career of senior authorities, as in 
the case of the Minister of Housing and Sanitation (Mr René 
Cornejo), who has played important roles in all administrations since 
2000 and eventually – and quite controversially – became prime 
minister early in 2014. This suggests that also the personal trajectory 
of key political players moving from one senior position to another in 
different governments has in itself an element of synchronic and 
diachronic corruption.   
 
Conclusion: Recognizing the Well-Known Unknown  
 
This brief account of the experience of corruption in Peru 
illustrates well the mismatch between the narrow, technocratic 
comprehension of corruption by national and international 
hegemonic agencies and the deeper social and political repercussions 
of the same practices. Corruption is more than simply the 
mishandling of public assets, but it effectively represents a 
misappropriation of social opportunities and the systematic 
marginalization of most of the national population. Corruption has 
palpable consequences for the lives of the whole population, first of 
all because it helps to reinstate in power conservative elites and 
maintain class-based hegemony. The previous section demonstrated 
that corruption has been a key social institution since colonial times, 
but it re-emerges and becomes particularly widespread in specific 
historical circumstances or specially associated with certain public 
sectors or public utilities. That was the case in Peru under the 
neoliberal reform of the state in the 1990s, which provided 
favourable opportunities for the manipulation of the political system 
and the capture of the revenues of privatization, and in relation to the 
investments in the water industry of Lima in the 2000s. Rather than a 
purely criminal or ethical issue, the activity of those promoting or 
benefiting from corruption represented a creative force for neoliberal 
interests and the organization of new accumulation strategies. 
Corruption is a social relation at the interface between different 
scales of interaction (the sectoral, local, national and international 
scales) and between long-term tendencies and contemporary 
developments.  It means that the metabolism of corruption involves 
spatial and temporal synergies that operate in synchronic and 
diachronic directions. Every new scandal involving public authorities 
in another ploy to make money and maintain political alliances (the 
synchronic element of corruption) is also nurtured by the long-lasting 
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organization of statecraft and socioeconomic exclusion (the 
diachronic element of corruption).  
Corruption may never have been so much in evidence in Peru 
since the fall of Fujimori in 2000 as it is now with the investigation 
about mishandling of water investments by the García administration. 
At the same time, it doesn’t seem to matter much, given that higher 
income groups benefit greatly from the export of primary 
commodities to global markets hungry for Peruvian minerals 
(especially in Asia). The majority of the population maintain a daily 
struggle for survival and have developed significant cynicism about 
national politics (largely because almost nobody is ever punished for 
practicing or soliciting corrupted practices). Most of the attention 
paid to corruption is driven by the initiatives of multilateral agencies 
and international NGOs, which campaign to improve the business 
context, preserve the flows of money and reinforce the model of 
development. This anti-corruption discourse narrowly focuses on the 
immediate threats to the integration of Peru into globalized markets, 
but it is an effort aimed to please foreign constituencies. Corruption 
is apparently a problem of the better-off, while the poor continue to 
suffer hunger, inflation and violence (Torres Guzmán, 2011). For the 
Peruvian society there is nothing really new in the fact that public 
authorities abuse their positions for private advantage and 90% of the 
population answered in a survey that do not report graft cases (The 
Economist, 2013). Every government since independence has 
promised the moralization of the state just to repeat the same 
practices and, at best, remove corrupt ministers and civil servants. 
The situation changed very little and almost all the names with some 
chance of running for presidency in 2016, as well as one quarter of 
the congress, were lately involved in obscure events or faced 
corruption charges. 
Particularly the controversies about the water sector of Lima 
contain all the element of the wider debate the future of the public 
sector and the extent that corruption is a problem with different 
epistemological basis and conflicting repercussions. The conservative 
modernization of the water utility of Lima demonstrates the perverse 
synergy between diachronic and synchronic corruption. The sector 
has always been a favourite locus of populism and an easy 
justification of large projects (when public funds or loans are 
available), which represents the diachronic pattern of corruption. But 
in more recent years the water services of Lima became the locus of 
massive investments and spurious transactions that were not 
dissociated from other criminal activities and large-scales projects 
synchronically promoted by the national government. Multiple 
strategies were needed to justify and implement those projects, 
including the manipulation of public involvement. Public 
participation has been significantly weakened in recent years 
following the World Bank protocol of ‘participation for results’. 
What has happened in Peru reflects the consideration of water 
corruption by agencies such as Transparency International (2008), 
which highlight the negative impacts of corruption on low-income 
groups and on the environment, but largely restrict is to a crisis of 
governance and as a threat to private sector participation. Corruption 
is not only a destructive phenomenon, but is can also be a productive 
process, at least from the perspective of those in power and directly 
or indirectly benefiting from corruption and those with other hidden 
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agendas. Overall, the effort to interpret and do something about 
corruption is only one chapter of the much wider struggle to 
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